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Echoes of Scholem and Jaspers in Margarethe von Trotta's Hannah Arendt
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Abstract: Margarethe von Trotta's 2012 film Hannah Arendt suggests that for Arendt the signal problem with Adolf
Eichmann had to do with a lack of thinking (the same problem Martin Heidegger diagnoses repeatedly in his book
What is Called Thinking). For Heidegger, we are "still" not thinking. For Arendt, what is characteristic of Eichmann is that
he does not think, meaning that he does not think as Aristotle defines thinking, namely as characteristic of the human
qua human, here conceiving thinking as an inherently philosophical project that is more than practical but always
contemplative (i.e., thinking about thinking). Is Eichmann monstrously evil, as many commentators are keen to insist—
or does his all-too-typically unthinking nature attest instead, as Arendt observed, to the banality of evil? Karl Jaspers
and Arendt would go beyond the lonely business of thought (as Heidegger spoke of the thinker) to argue that whatever
thinking can be, it is inherently political and can only be done with other human beings in community or as both Arendt
and Jaspers spoke of the formation of a world.
Keywords: Arendt, Hannah; von Trotta, Margarethe; Sebald, Winfried Georg; Jonas, Hans; Heidegger, Martin;
Eichmann in Jerusalem; banality; thinking; film and philosophy.

If I had known this would happen,
I probably would have done precisely
what I did do.1
Hannah Arendt

Interiors
Margarethe von Trotta's 2013 film Hannah Arendt,
starring Barbara Sukowa, manages to raise sociopolitical questions (and doing this is quite something
for any film) as well as (and this is even more difficult)
specific philosophical questions by exploring the

still contentious context of Arendt's 1963 Eichmann in
Jerusalem.2 The film, as most reviews point to this, offers
a reading of Arendt's views as articulated in the subtitle
of her Eichmann book: A Report on the Banality of Evil.
At the same time, having noted this achievement, the
film also omits (in the interest of public absorbability,
so one must assume) all kinds of detail while eliding
the names of key individuals that should have been
included as Arendt's correspondence with these same
individuals served as sources for the film's dialogue,
2

1

Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Correspondence 1926-1969,
eds. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, trans. Robert and
Rita Kimber, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
1992, p. 511. [Henceforth cited as C]

Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the
Banality of Evil, trans. Amos Elon, New York: Viking,
1963. Originally published serially as "Eichmann in
Jerusalem–I," The New Yorker, February 16, 1963; "II –
Eichmann in Jerusalem," February 23, 1963ff.

Babette Babich, "Arendt's Radical Good and the Banality of Evil: Echoes of Scholem and Jaspers in Margarethe von Trotta's Hannah Arendt,"
Existenz 9/2 (2014), 13-26
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namely the exchange of letters between Arendt and
Gershom Scholem3 as well as the correspondence
between Arendt and Karl Jaspers).4
In what follows I shall not concentrate on an
analysis of the film's representation of Arendt's and
Heidegger's friendship (which began as a love affair
when the then 18 year old Arendt was Heidegger's
student in Marburg) as Margarethe von Trotta depicts
this in vignettes, and so by way of a series of flashbacks,
including a scene with Heidegger on his knees, drawn
from what Arendt tells Hans Jonas about Heidegger's
approach to her and its significance for her. But the
scene itself hardly does justice even to Jonas' retelling
of Arendt's confidence and one can only suppose that
the vignette was compressed in the interest of public
consumption.
The flashbacks to Heidegger and Arendt's
first encounter can also seem to have an inevitably
caricaturish quality which may be attributed to the
casting of Klaus Pohl to play the 35 year old "young"
Heidegger, as well as the "old" Heidegger (it is
common, even if inaccurate, to suppose that men do
not change that much as they age). But the 6o year old
Pohl needed a good deal of make-up (complete with
Death in Venice style, shoe-black hair) and this, perhaps
more than anything particular to the flashback device
as such, may have lent the film's "younger" Heidegger
a more than ordinarily lurid look by contrast with the
in-fact "young Arendt," played by the-then 26 year old
Friederike Becht. Still, and as von Trotta underlines,
her film precluded anything more than fleeting
representations of the two, as the director's design of her
film foregrounded the contrast between Heidegger and
Arendt: "They are adversaries in the film. She is the one
who is thinking, he is the one who is not thinking, who
falls into the trap of the Nazi Party. It's not stupidity, but
thoughtlessness."5
3

See Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt/
Gershom Scholem Der Briefwechsel, eds. Marie Luise
Knott and David Heredia, Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag im
Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010. [Henceforth cited as B]

4

See in English, Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers,
Correspondence 1926-1969, trans. Robert and Rita
Kimmer, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992.

5

Margarethe von Trotta, Interview with Graham Fuller:
"Q&A: Margarethe von Trotta on Filming Hannah
Arendt's Public Ordeal," Blouin Artinfo, 30/05/13.
[Henceforth cited as MTF] As von Trotta began by
noting, there is an irony to this, just because the love
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The socio-political has been much discussed in the
reviews,6 both laudatory and damning and to be sure,
even those accounts predisposed to praise the film duly
criticize Arendt on the matter of Eichmann in Jerusalem,
getting in a few reservations, of the "Hannah Arendt
was right about x but wrong about y" variety.
The film itself is a series of tableaus or evocative
angle—any love angle, can be expected to sell films:
"If Pam and I had said, at the beginning, that we were
going to make a film about the [notional] love story
between Eichmann and Hannah Arendt, we would
have got the financing for the film much more quickly
than we did! Of course, we didn't want to make a love
story about Hannah and Martin—though it would have
been more affecting for many people." Of course and
in addition to the account by Elzbieta Ettinger, Hannah
Arendt/Martin Heidegger, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997, others too, some more theoretically
minded than others, have explored this relationship,
including Daniel Maier-Katin, Stranger from Abroad:
Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Friendship and
Forgiveness, New York: Norton, 2010 [henceforth cited
as SA]; see my review: Babette Babich, "Daniel MaierKatin, Stranger from Abroad: Hannah Arendt, Martin
Heidegger, Friendship and Forgiveness. NY: Norton,
2010," Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish
Studies 29/4 (Summer 2011), 189-91. [Henceforth,
cited as DMK]
6

Among the many reviews, it is worth noting the review
that appears in The New Yorker, as this might be seen
as echoing the film's highlighting of the publication
career of Arent's Eichmann in Jerusalem as a book that
began as a "Reporter at Large's" serial correspondence
for the iconic New Yorker Magazine, namely Richard
Brody's faintly laudatory review, "Hannah Arendt"
and the Glorification of Thinking, reviewing "Hannah
Arendt (director: Margarethe von Trotta; 2013)," The
New Yorker (May 31, 2013). Brody who encapsulates
von Trotta's film as a "narrow-bore bio-pic," in the New
Yorker section of short reviews, "The Film File." See
by contrast, highlighting the question of evil as well
as the elusive quality of thinking for Arendt, Roger
Berkowitz's assessment: "Lonely Thinking: Hannah
Arendt on Film," The Paris Review 30 (May 2013). See
too, Mark Lilla who ostensibly raises the tone if not
the stakes (Lilla leaves no doubt about the stakes as he
begins by quoting Primo Levi's The Drowned and the
Saved), in his contribution, "Arendt & Eichmann: The
New Truth" in the New York Review of Books (November
21, 2013), in which Lilla discusses von Trotta's film
along with Martin Wiebel's collection, Hannah Arendt:
Ihr Denken veränderte die Welt, Munich: Piper, 2013,
and there are many others.
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interiors, beautifully theatrical. Von Trotta's film is
also a film of interiority, beautifully understated. In
consequence the actors do an enormous amount of
work on and for the film, especially Barbara Sukowa as
Arendt7 but also Axel Milberg who plays her husband
Heinrich Blücher as a man with ongoing affairs (we
get several tableaus introducing these, cinema verité
style, softened by the clear affection with which
Millberg's Blücher treats his wife), an edgy and well cast
Janet McTeer as Mary McCarthy as well as Nicholas
Woodeson as William Shawn and Ulrich Noethen—
who plays Hans Jonas to perfection—and Michael
Degen as Kurt Blumenfeld. The actors' achievement,
especially Sukowa's but also Milberg's, has been rightly
noted in several reviews and along with the director's
mastery, the actors' collective excellence makes this film
worth watching, if what makes the film remarkable is its
heretofore unique representation of the complicatedly
"academic" life, as Arendt wrote, "of the mind."
The majority of comments have observed, as I
will also do, the sheer intensity or force of the audience
reaction to the film, especially in New York City itself—
where the film seems to elicit as much response today
as The New Yorker magazine series and Eichmann book
did decades ago. To this extent, the film bears important
witness to the extent to which Arendt's political thinking
retains its provocative power.
In all the reactions to Arendt, including as shall
be noted below the strong reactions to her character,
7

Anthony O. Scott foregrounds Sukowa's excellence
(nothing like a comparison with Meryl Streep), "How
It Looks to Think: Watch Her—'Hannah Arendt,' with
Barbara Sukowa and Janet McTeer," featured as "Critic's
Pick," The New York Times, May 28, 2013 [Hereafter
cited as HLT]. And yet even superlatives, as in the case
of Thomas Assheuer's politically correct review in Die
Zeit can be turned around, when Assheuer concludes
his review with the qualified encomium: "Yet Barbara
Sukowa plays the character so convincingly, that
her arguments reliably merge with the aura of her
personality, which means: Arendt is always right, for
if one so courageously resists the witch hunt, such a
one must have the truth on her side." [Translated by the
author.] Thomas Assheuer, "Ist das Böse wirklich banal?
Die Filmregisseurin Margarethe von Trotta huldigt der
Philosophin Hannah Arendt—und verschleiert ihre
Irrtümer," Die Zeit (10 February 2013). And in a gentler
spirit, to be sure, the son of the late Susan Sontag,
David Rieff in his review "Hannah and Her Admirers,"
The Nation (November 19, 2013), highlights Sukowa's
moral sensibility even above her acting.

i.e., her perceived arrogance, as to Eichmann, and
even Heidegger, few responses have attended to what
is for me the striking parallel that might be made
between Germany and Israel in von Trotta's syncretistic
historical film. Arendt herself suggests some of this
when she writes to Jaspers just before Christmas Eve,
1960,8 anticipating the possible directions the Eichmann
process might be expected to take. Where Jaspers and
Blücher (reduced to Blücher alone in von Trotta's film)
express concerns about "the legal basis of the trial,"
Arendt herself was less pessimistic, even granting as
she wrote to Jaspers, that "Eichmann was kidnapped,
just plain abducted and hauled off" (C 414), a justifying
case could made for it, so Arendt argued, listing three
counter-arguments.9 But nonetheless she did feel
uneasy; as she went on to write:
It's a pretty sure bet that there'll be an effort to show
Israeli youth and (worse yet) the whole world certain
things. Among others, that Jews who aren't Israelis will
wind up in situations where they'll let themselves be
slaughtered like sheep. Also: that the Arabs were hand
in glove with the Nazis. [C 416]

Arendt's sensibility to the German background
presence in Israel is also marked. Thus she writes to Jaspers
from Jerusalem on 13 April 1961 to praise Moshe Landau,
the "chief justice" as "superb," noting that "all three of the
Judges are German Jews," and describing the "comedy
of speaking Hebrew when everyone involved knows
German and thinks in German" (C 434).10 Here by taking
this observation to a further parallel between Israel and
Germany, I risk treading on dangerous ground and with
all the associations that haunt Hannah Arendt's Eichmann
in Jerusalem, I am reminded of the arch tone of Arendt's
letter to Karl Jaspers where she takes the opportunity to
8

The letter is sent with a coda on Christmas Eve before
going out for a holiday dinner.

9

What Arendt finds "troublesome" however "is how
the Israelis keep stressing that Eichmann 'voluntarily'
agreed to go to Israel and appear before a court there.
Something is obviously not right there. (Torture?
Threats? God knows what they did.)" [C 416].

10

Arendt sums up this impression in a cascade of
identifying characterizations: "On top, the judges, the
best of German Jewry. Below them, the prosecuting
attorneys, Galicians, but still Europeans. Everything
is organized by a police force that gives me the
creeps, speaks only Hebrew, and looks Arabic. Some
downright brutal types among them. They would
obey any order" (C 435).
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relate Blücher's acerbic comment: "If the Jews insist on
becoming a nation like every other nation, why for God's
sake do they insist on becoming like the Germans?" (C
118)11—only to add that "there is some truth" to Blücher's
rhetorical question. A more comprehensive reading
would set Blücher's remark and Arendt's reflection
into the circumstantial context of the long-term debate
between Arendt and Jaspers (and of course an internal
debate for Arendt herself) on the question of whether
German Jews were to be accounted first as Germans or,
first, and foremost, as Jews, a reflection that also echoes in
her letters to Scholem.12
Daniel Meier-Katkin's monograph on Hannah
Arendt's relationship to Heidegger cites complicated
remarks on this matter of German-ness and Jewishness
along with other excerpts from Arendt's correspondence
with Jaspers so as to paint a subtly differentiated picture
of what can only be an extremely sensitive issue as we
are so often permitted only a pro or con on any given
view, even the question of one person's love for another.
Reflecting on the film, von Trotta notes Arendt's complex
reply to her niece who asked her at the end of her life
about the paradoxical and seemingly contradictory
character of her love for Heidegger, "There are things
that are bigger than a human being" (MTF).
Even more elusively than love-affairs and gossip
(and this matters for the Arendt who defined herself
as a political thinker above all) we have little sense that
in addition to Arendt herself, condemning in her letter
to Jaspers the "acts of terrorism by Jewish groups" (SA
150) to which I have already referred was no isolated
instance but reflected views also held by—as MaierKatkin emphasizes and as is often forgotten—other
prominent New York City area Jewish intellectuals
including the philosopher Sidney Hook as well as the
physicist Albert Einstein likewise held complicated
11

12

This correspondence between Arendt and Jaspers is
cited in Daniel Maier-Katkin, Stranger from Abroad,
New York: W.W. Norton 2010, pp. 149-50. See also,
Annette Vowinckel, Geschichtsbegriff und Historisches
Denken bei Hannah Arendt, Cologne: Böhlau 2001,
esp. pp. 135ff [henceforth cited as GHD] but see
too Steven E. Aschheim, "Hannah Arendt and Karl
Jaspers: Friendship, Catastrophe and the Possibilities
of German-Jewish Dialogue," in Steven E. Aschheim,
Culture and Catastrophe. German and Jewish Confrontations
with National Socialism and Other Crises, New York: New
York University Press, 1996. [Henceforth cited as CC]
See Arendt's long and complex letter of 20 July 1963, B
444. Cf. Jaspers' assessment in C 525 and GHD 136.
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views on Zionism.
But it is not enough to bring in the Princeton genius
Albert Einstein and the Columbia University Professor,
Sidney Hook, because the problem in the case of Arendt
went far beyond her views alone.
Arendt's point is the same point made to a different
end and with a different sensibility with regard to the
constitutional point that was emphasized by my friend
Jacob Taubes writing on the significance and role of Carl
Schmitt for the grounding of the state of Israel in his The
Political Theology of Paul,13 with all the "I lived through
this" matter-of-fact consciousness characterizing one
of his most important books that also happens to be in
its substance, a political theological study of political
theological events. Taubes' Schmitt correspondence is
translated into English,14 but his The Political Theology of
Paul is about St. Paul's even older political letter, and as
some suggest offered a direct inspiration for Agamben's

13

I refer here to Taubes' account of the role played by
Schmitt's Verfassungslehre which, as Taubes tells it, was
summoned into Israel for the use of Pinchas Rosen
in drafting the Constitution of the then-new State of
Israel. A young recipient in 1948 of the Warburg Prize,
Taubes found himself in Jerusalem during the division
of the city, and was directed (with a nice remark on the
perfect preservation of the German Ordinarius in Israel)
to read seventeenth century philosophy, thus Descartes
and thereby the law. Heading to the library to check
an excursus on notion of law by the Nazi and Catholic
Jurist, Carl Schmitt, Taubes reports an all-too familiarly
academic encounter between scholar and librarian:
"Na, der guckt mich an, der Beamte, mit Genuß und
Sadismus, ha, das dauer drei Monate bis so'n Zettel
bearbeitet wird." Even the head librarian told the same
story, before Taubes received a call only three weeks
later "Kommen Sie, das Buch ist da!" See Jacob Taubes,
Die politische Theologie des Paulus: Vorträge gehalten an
der Forschungsstätte der evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft
in Heidelberg, 23-27 Februar 1987, Munich: Wilhelm Fink
1995, pp. 133-35, here p. 134. In the same locus, to be
sure. Taubes emphasizes that the constitution of Israel
did not then yet exist, adding (a wonderful reflection
on incommensurability) that there will never be such.

14

Jacob Taubes, To Carl Schmitt: Letters and Reflections,
trans. Keith Tribe, New York: Columbia, 2013. The
cover of the book features a folded letter although
Taubes, as I know from having some of these and from
having seen some of his notes to Schmitt, was also in
the habit of writing full across the back of postcards
and posting these enclosed in an envelope.
Volume 9, No. 2, Fall 2014
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own book on St. Paul.15 Taubes was writing (or more
accurately said, Taubes had as good as written) that same
book when I sat in on his seminars in Berlin in the mideighties, seminars to which everyone, die ganze Welt, le tout
Berlin, at least among the students, would flock (in a nontrivial fashion, one might argue that Taubes functioned as
a kind of male Hannah Arendt—they certainly shared the
same Gershom Sholem who, like Jaspers to be sure, does
not make an appearance in von Trotta's film, although
Scholem certainly haunts the quotes) and although
Taubes met Arendt, they got on about as well as Arendt
and Theodor Adorno, albeit for different reasons.
Like Adorno, Arendt would be vigorously
denounced for arrogance, an arrogance von Trotta's
film also documents (Arendt's colleagues indict her in
just this language and von Trotta's film thus illustrates
a common side of academic non-collegiality). It is also
Arendt's arrogance that colors von Trotta's depiction
(this is more of the film's signal syncretism) of the
falling out between Hannah Arendt and the Hans Jonas
who would go on to make what one might describe
as monotonic ethics his personal calling card. In von
Trotta's film, Jonas is represented as the injured party, a
favoring that is unsurprising as the film drew on Jonas'
Memoirs (and therewith his point of view).16 The contrast
between arrogance and the steadfast adherence to a
conventionally received ethical viewpoint is key. Where
arrogance is regarded as a vice, modesty is a virtue, most
especially for a woman, a troublesome demand for an
academic and an intellectual like Arendt. The vice of
arrogance is also supposed to be emotive (though on
whose side remains an open question) and perforce
irrational.
Following this associative chain, in what can
appear to be the rule for discussions of the Eichman
15

16

Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary
on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005. Randi Rashkover,
Freedom and Law: A Jewish-Christian Apologetics, New
York: Fordham University Press 2011, discusses the
parallel with Taubes, see pp. 26ff, as I do in DMK 191.
So Jonas recounts the necessity of their break. See
Hans Jonas, Memoirs, ed. Christian Wiese, trans.
Krishna Winston, Waltham: Brandeis University Press
2008, p. 182 [henceforth cited as M]. But the break was
not a final one, as Jonas also points out, attributing
this to his wife's better sensibilities, and Arendt and
Jonas would reconcile. Indeed and I emphasize this
elsewhere, Jonas attests to her "genius for friendship"
in his eulogy for Arendt.

process, in particular for Richard Wolin,17 it can be
argued that what caused Nazism was consummate
irrationality (and in this Wolin follows Georg Lukács'
argument as do contemporary representatives of the
Frankfurt School departing as they do, and beginning
with Jürgen Habermas, from Max Horkheimer's and
Adorno's more dialectical reflections).18 Such logic
is impeccable: Nazism has to have been caused by
irrationality, because if not, what are we scholars doing
here and elsewhere and how to ensure, to quote the
political theorist Tracy Strong, "that it will not happen
again"?19 As Adorno himself explains, the "premier
demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not
happen again…never again Auschwitz."20 Making
Hannah Arendt's point in his own voice regarding the
banality of evil, Adorno defines "banality" as what one
translator softens into bourgeois subjectivity but which
can also be named capitalist subjectivity.
Above I suggested that the depiction of the
generational and social politics of Israel in the 1960s in
von Trotta's Hannah Arendt parallels the generational
politics in Germany, not only in the 1960s but in the last
several decades. Unrelated to von Trotta or Arendt,
several authors have examined Germany's social
politics, none so painfully etched as Winfried Georg
17

Representative here would be Richard Wolin, Heidegger's
Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and
Herbert Marcuse, Princeton University Press, 2003.

18

See Richard Wolin, The Seduction of Unreason: The
Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to
Postmodernism, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006. For a more comprehensive discussion, see János
Kelemen, The Rationalism of Georg Lukács, London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

19

Tracy B. Strong, "Introduction" in Tracy B. Strong,
ed., Nietzsche, Surrey: Ashgate 2009, p. xxvi. Strong
reprises this theme in a more general fashion in his
more recent Politics Without Vision: Thinking Without
a Bannister in the 21st Century, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2012.

20

Theodor Adorno, "Education After Auschwitz," in Can
One Live After Auschwitz: A Philosophical Reader, ed.
Rolf Tiedemann, Stanford: Stanford University Press
2003, p. 19. But Adorno's concern compounds cause
and occasion: "One speaks of the threat of a relapse
into barbarism. But it was not a threat—Auschwitz
was this relapse, and barbarism continues as long as
the fundamental conditions that favored this relapse
continue largely unchanged. That is the whole horror."
[Emphasis added]
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Sebald's Zürich Lectures, Luftkrieg und Literatur21—"Air
War and Literature"—featuring a Nietzschean motto
that stems from a fairly unlikely voice, which may be
why we might be able to hear it, the science fiction author
and satirist, Stanislaw Lem: "The trick of elimination is
every expert's defensive reflex."22 Later when I return to
von Trotta's film, we will see that Arendt herself refers
to the contemporary media and its technical prowess,
that is to say just the same perception of thoroughgoing
persecution that her critics have in the past sought to
discount as imaginary:
die Meinungsmanipulation in der modernen Welt wird
bekanntlich weitgehend durch die Methoden des "imagemaking" bewirkt, d.h. dadurch, daß man bestimmte
"Bilder" in die Welt setzt, die nicht nur nichts mit der
Realität zu tun haben, sondern häufig nur dazu dienen,
bestimmte unangenehme Realitäten zu verdecken.23

Sebald's lectures and addenda would be published
posthumously in English as part of his On the Natural
History of Destruction. The title isn't Sebald's own. Credit
for that goes to Lord Solly Zuckerman in his description of
Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, and the Luftkrieg in question
corresponds to Sir Harris' very British, anti-German design.
What von Trotta thus illuminates with her film, at
least in my viewing, was the point with which Sebald
concludes his own retrospective introduction to his
study to the extent that many authors, themselves well
aware of the dangers to their own future reception,
dangers of the sort Arendt herself seemingly did not
imagine, were apparently less concerned with giving
voice to what they had experienced but were more
preoccupied "with the self-image they wished to hand
down" accommodated as that would have been, at
one time to one regime, and then again to another. For
Sebald this self-censoring "was one of the main reasons
for the inability of a whole generation of German
authors to describe what they had seen and to convey it
to our minds" (NHD x).
21

Winfried Georg Sebald, Luftkrieg und Literatur, Berlin:
Hanser, 2009.

22

From Stanislaw Lem, Imaginary Magnitude, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich 1984, p. 23, quoted as epigraph to the first
lecture in W.G. Sebald, On the Natural History of Destruction,
New York: Modern Library 2004, p. 1 [henceforth
cited as NHD]. Lem's own point continues: "were he
less ruthless, he would drown in a flood of paper."

23

Hannah Arendt, "Gespräch mit Thilo Koch," in
Hannah Arendt, Ich will verstehen, ed. Ursula Ludz,
Munich: Piper 1996, p. 39.

http://www.existenz.us

Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem is written at a time
when it is not utterly clear to all that this "unutterability,"
as Sebald speaks of it, would be and would have
to be the rule. Jaspers sought to elude it and I think
he succeeded at the time, and, I think, Arendt also
succeeded (at least in part) but she did not succeed in the
writerly way Sebald would have wanted not because
Arendt was not a writer but because what she writes is
political philosophy rather than literature. For Sebald,
we need a literary, not a theoretical writer's voice. If he
himself offered such a writer's voice, it was only with a
certain dissonance, at least in terms of the reception of
his work. For Sebald, the reception (or reader response)
itself called for understanding. For in addition to the
odd hectoring letters Sebald received, there were many
more that would testify, so he wrote, to the "sense of
unparalleled national humiliation felt by millions in
the last years of the war had never really found verbal
expression, and that those affected by the experience
neither shared it with one another nor passed it on to
the next generation" (NHD x). Thus Sebald reflects upon
Alexander Kluge's analysis of the war and of its wake
or aftermath such that "it never became an experience
capable of public decipherment" (NHD 4).
These are complicated points needing another
argument; indeed, many other arguments, and rather
more temporal distance. Here it will do to note that
Sebald drew reviews, like von Trotta's film, both
laudatory and damning. Some in direct response to
the Zürich lectures as he discusses these in his own
afterword. But what is significant here and to this extent
it resembles the impact of von Trotta's film, especially
but not only for New York audiences, some of these
responses are posthumous. And for the most part such
posthumous critiques dramatize a return to the status
quo ante. Perhaps the experience remains incapable of
public decipherment, in Kluge's words, and perhaps it
cannot be otherwise.
Sebald's concern is not ordinary Germans during
the war—the how-did-that, how-could-that-happen
character of a concern with which we are well acquainted.
Instead he quotes the Swedish journalist Stig Degerman's
1946 report of nothing so much as a landscape of
destruction at which no one of the inhabitants was willing
to look. As Sebald describes the journalist's report,
writing from Hamburg that on a train going at normal
speed it took him a quarter of an hour to travel the
lunar landscape between Hasselbrook and Landwehr,
and in all that vast wilderness, perhaps the most
horrifying expanse of ruins in the whole of Europe, he
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did not see a single living soul. [NHD 30]

What struck him most was that he identified himself
as alien, as "a foreigner himself because he looked out"
(NHD 30).
I myself (and I've already referred to Taubes) spent
time in Germany in what certainly seemed to me to be
millions of years after the war: from 1984 onwards and
I always return. The first few years I would observe
and ask those I met for information or news or any
details at all about the only thing any American—we
were the victors—ever thought about. This is the von
Trotta parallel for me, to me. For, like the alienation of
the younger generation of Israel, to their parents, those
who had escaped the holocaust in Germany and Poland
and France, as von Trotta's Kurt Blumenfeld invokes
this circumstance at the first café scene with Hannah
Arendt in Jerusalem, in reply to the question that she
carried from her second husband Heinrich Blücher (I
only say second husband to mitigate the film's depiction
of his affair(s) and her tolerance of the same), that apart
from disinterest, the younger generation also harbored
disturbing criticisms, adding charges of cowardice to
generational non-comprehension. It was this wall of
incomprehension, disinterest, or a concern with other
issues—and Israel certainly had other issues—that
reminded me of Germany. For none of my German
friends, all of whom had been born in the fifties after the
war (I was born in 1956), had any stories to tell to answer
any of my questions. Many did not speak to their parents
about the war (none of my friends' immediate relatives
had been Nazis, so I would have had to believe, if I had
believed it, even those who were officers during the
war), and if they did speak to their parents, of those that
did, there were certainly no open replies. When I spoke
to people like my professors, things were no different. I
even asked Taubes himself, but he had spent the war in
Switzerland writing his doctoral thesis and what struck
me was that he did not feel altogether sanguine about it,
but mocked himself, recalling at some length Scholem's
unsuccessful efforts to get him, to emigrate to Israel
and to rue a brilliant colleague's death who had been as
courageous as he was brilliant and who had indeed, as
Taubes had not, gone to Israel. Scholem's word Verräter,24
also included a condemnation of Taubes' generic and
human (just matter of fact) cowardice.
24

See for a discussion, Babette Babich, "Ad Jacob
Taubes," New Nietzsche Studies: Nietzsche and the Jews,
eds. Debra Bergoffen, Babette Babich, and David B.
Allison, 7/3&4, (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), v-x.

What Sebald's Swedish correspondent Stig
Degerman reported of strangers, these my friends lived
through in the heart of their family, small anecdotes
of survival, the pain and bodily damage suffered by
escape, the long distances walked on foot to return
home or to flee for better parts in the aftermath of the
war, all surrounded by silence.
Von Trotta could thus, perhaps, I do not know this,
draw upon her own memories and the memories of
her parents and her grandparents in order to see the
exactly national tension and difference made by such
a generational distinction. Add to this what is also
relevant in is Israel and which also runs throughout
Arendt's correspondence with Jaspers, namely the
different origins and contexts, the precise political
definition of an Israeli as we note that this continues
to be the contested subject of an interior conflict that is
the legacy of Zionism as it endures today and that has
already reached any number of calamitous peaks, most
brutally now in Gaza after the summer of 2014 and
without any seeming resolution.25
The Ghost of Jaspers
Karl Jaspers is one of the most important existential
phenomenologists even as today and given the
ascendancy of analytic phenomenology and speculative
philosophy in the now vanishing tradition of what had
been Continental Philosophy, Jaspers is increasingly less
read as either an existentialist or a phenomenologist.
Technically it would be better to invoke an ExistenzPhänomenologie, following Jaspers' own usage and the
current author is perhaps more alive to this dimension
of Jaspers' thought than many philosophers today
as she reads him from the perspective of continental
philosophy of science, especially from the perspective of
Friedrich Nietzsche, especially as read from Heidegger's
concern with modern science and modern technology
25

There are a number of new voices raised here. See for
one collection, among many other contributions, Gianni
Vattimo and Michael Marder, eds., Deconstructing
Zionism: A Critique of Political Metaphysics, London:
Bloomsbury, 2013, see with particular reference to
Arendt, Judith Butler's chapter three here: "Is Judaism
Zionism? Or, Arendt and the Critique of the NationState," included as chapter four in her own, with a
follow up chapter on Arendt and the "Quandaries of
the Plural" in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the Critique
of Zionism, New York: Columbia University Press
2013, pp. 114-50 and 151-80.
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too, perspectives often neglected by even Jaspers'
best followers. In a certain sense, like any one of such
multifarious virtuosity, Jaspers suffered from this
virtuosity, like Heidegger with respect to technology
and science, and like Arendt with respect to politics,
especially what Jaspers called world politics, which
today has come to be flattened, in a fulfillment of Guy
Debord's spectacular schematism,26 as a world with less
and less space or time, in the monotone schema we call
globalization.
Jaspers also, not unlike Heidegger in his own
postwar writings, reflected that the postwar environment
seemed to extinguish "all self-being" and he went on to
argue, and this could not but have been influential for
Arendt, "resistance will still be offered by any felicitous
meeting of individuals who band together in fact without
oath or pathos. 'Truth begins with two,' said Nietzsche."27
Again, Jaspers repeats the Nietzsche citation when he
writes in The Future of Mankind of the enduring and still
possibility of human community "in reason, love, and
truth…Nietzsche's word 'Truth begins when there are
two,' is borne out by every community of individuals."28
Thus we read Jaspers on the world, as we like
to take that world to be objective. This is the world
of science, the world of facts. Trained as a scientist, a
physician, as he was, Jaspers could not pretend to the
layman's misapprehension of the objective as if this
were part of the facts, the factual world, part of the facts
that Nietzsche will tell us that there are not.29
26

"The capitalist production system has unified space,
breaking down the boundaries between one society
and the next." Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle,
Detroit: Black & Red 2000 [1967], p. 165.

27

Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, Vol. 1, trans. E. B. Ashton,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1969, p. 36.
[Henceforth cited as P1]

28

Karl Jaspers, The Future of Mankind, trans. E. B. Ashton,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961, p. 223.
[Henceforth cited as FM]
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As Nietzsche writes: "Nein gerade Tatsachen gibt es
nicht, nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein Faktum 'an
sich' feststellen: vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu
wollen. 'Es ist alles subjektiv' sagt ihr: aber schon das ist
Auslegung, das 'Subjekt' ist nichts Gegebenes, sondern
etwas
Hinzu-Erdichtetes,
Dahinter-Gestecktes."
Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, eds.
Giorgio Colli and Mazzini Montinari, Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1980, Vol. 12, 7, p.60. See on this my own
discussion in Babette Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of
Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life,
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For Jaspers likewise: the "objective world" is "never
given solely" or "as such" (P1 113). Much rather, and
this is the hermeneutic heart of Jasper's constitutive
phenomenology, encountering the world as "I find it I
have to gain access to it by my activity. No experience
can be made without some course of conduct" (P1
113). At the same time, Jaspers also emphasizes that
this interpretive, interventive precondition does not
reduce the world to a fiction: "The objective world is
never solely made either" (P1 113). The point is counterintuitive (and we do well to remember that science-war
blowback to similar claims induced both Ian Hacking
and Bruno Latour to tone down their claims, in some
cases, all the way back to objectivist retraction).30
The world, the entire world as Jaspers speaks of it,
here invoking a concept more conventionally associated
with either Ludwig Wittgenstein or indeed Heidegger,
is for Jaspers, "a boundary concept" (P1 171). For
Jaspers, however, this is not solely an existential notion
of world. Much rather for Jaspers, who remained a
Kantian throughout his life, the world is a question.
The problem is what science leaves out, in order, indeed
to be science. The first point cannot be recused in this
epistemic and moral context as it follows no one but
Kant (and Nietzsche after him—as we seem to need
Jaspers to remind us that and "Still, Nietzsche came after
Kant.")31 Nietzsche had argued, infamously enough,
that the world is interpretation according to a human
schema that we cannot throw off. The ineliminability
of such a constitution is twofold for Jaspers. Thus and
Albany: State University of New York Press 1994 (in
German: Oxford, 2010), especially chapter three.
30

See for references and discussion, Babette Babich
"Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental
Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,"
International Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 24/4
(December 2010), 343-91, in particular, p. 346. Jaspers
goes on to explain using the example of the lived life
of the laboratory, as Norwood Russell Hanson but
also as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger might equally
have spoken of it, that "In scientific world orientation
we see empirical reality in both the given world and
the one that remains to be made. But there is no cut-off
point. What has been made will henceforth be given
and what is given has the unpredictable modifiability
of new productive material" (P1 113).

31

Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of his Philosophical Activity, trans.
Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press 1965, p. 287.
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to begin with, "the world in its entirety cannot become
an object. We are in the world and can never face it as
a whole." 32 But beyond this, it is also the case that we
think, that we are human, that we are conscious—and
here Jaspers might have gone beyond Kant to Fichte
and Hegel but he adds his own gloss by speaking
almost as Schelling might have done, of "our awareness
of our freedom," arguing that thereby "we transcend the
incomplete world we can know" (PW 130).
The word freedom itself however is importantly
Kantian in this context, as Jaspers' own powerful
and insightful reading of Kant's "Perpetual Peace"
demonstrates (see PW 88-124). I argue that Jaspers
is unique in attending to Kant's situation and hence
to the significance of attending to his style and above
all including Kant's irony as well as with reference to
Nietzsche, his humor (PW 97ff, 120ff, 257ff).33
I have observed that it is Jaspers, arguably even
more than Scholem himself, who may be argued to
have been one of the missing keys or critical ghosts in
Margarethe von Trotta's Hannah Arendt, even where the
spirit of the film, as one might put it was drawn as already
noted above from Hans Jonas' Memoirs. In life, Jaspers
was the replacement philosopher-father to whom
Arendt's teacher Martin Heidegger, who was also at the
time more rather than less inclined to regard Jaspers as
his own paternal influence, kinder than Husserl (at least
to begin with, and seemingly sharing many of his own
intellectual passions well), and to whom Heidegger
recommended (or transferred) Hannah Arendt. Under
Jaspers' direction, Arendt would write a thesis written
on, seemingly as if to illuminate the point of transfer,
Love and St. Augustine.34
32

33

34

Karl Jaspers, "The Creation of the World," in Philosophy and
the World: Selected Essays and Lectures, Washington, DC:
Regnery Gateway 1989, p. 129 [henceforth cited as PW].
It goes without saying that most enthusiasts of the
Königsbergian king of thought, even those who attend
to his style, tend to exclude his irony. On Kant's style
(duly omitting irony), see Willi Goetschel, Constituting
Critique: Kant's Writing as Critical Praxis, trans. Eric
Schwab, Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. I
emphasize the relevance of this irony and this reading
does depend upon my foregrounding of the question
of writerly style in Babich, "On Nietzsche's Judgment
of Style and Hume's Quixotic Taste: On the Science
of Aesthetics and 'Playing' the Satyr," The Journal of
Nietzsche Studies 43/2 (2012), 240-59.
See, in addition to my remarks here and elsewhere the
insightful contextual reading by Ludger Lutkehaus,

Thus what is striking for me is the connection that
Arendt forged with Jaspers, for it was indeed Jaspers
and not Blumenfield, as depicted in the film, who would
serve throughout his life as Arendt's "intellectual" and
in German that is to say "spiritual" father (though the
back turned on her at the film's end would have been,
once more in a match-game of syncretistic substitution,
not unlike the moves tracked in another film by
another director, the late Alain Resnais' L'année dernièr
à Marienbad, would not be that of the dying Blumenfeld
but rather Scholem, verbally or metaphorically
speaking, the very Scholem Arendt always called by
the name she knew from her youth—Gerhard).
Maybe the film can do little more than show traces of
these ghosts, this vanished spirit. Perhaps that is the heart
of film, even such a one of theatrically composed Riverside
Drive interiors and locations, in addition to the New
School, upstate New York, Bard College, Jerusalem,
Marburg, but also Heidegger's Black Forest Freiburg.
But, just to return once more to the theme at the
outset, can one in fact make a film on the life of the
academic mind? Can one illustrate Heidegger's teaching,
as Arendt will write of him, that "perhaps it is possible
to learn to think," as von Trotta's film makes college level
German language (arts and culture) instruction, indeed
even teaching German as well as political philosophy,
even including German Departmental politics, central
throughout her film, offering a rare dramatization of
the life of the professor as a professor and that is to say
among other professors? And if the challenges of filming
academic loci from the ecstatic encounters between
student and professor at Marburg to the all-American
classroom dynamics at Bard College or the New School
are well-met in the achievements of von Trotta's film, the
filming of thinking remains elusive.
Thinking
Can a film illustrate thinking?35 How can a film show the
minds of thinkers like Arendt, or Heidegger, or Jaspers?
Arendt might appear straightforward enough concerned
as she is with the world, the same 'love of the world' that
"Hannah Arendt–Martin Heidegger: eine Liebe in
Deutschland," Text+Kritik 166/167 (2005), originally
published in opsculum format: Hannah Arendt–
Martin Heidegger: Eine Liebe in Deutschland, Marburg:
Basilisken-Presse, 1999.
35

See HLT and see Roger Berkowitz's review, "Lonely
Thinking: Hannah Arendt on Film," The Paris Review
30 (May 2013).
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other scholars have celebrated in books of their own,
concerned as Arendt is with the "Human Condition"
but also as politically focused as she was. And yet
this does not quite prove to be so and we are still left
with the need to read and to think for ourselves. And
Jaspers although he does not appear, haunts the film's
presentation of Arendt's conflicts with Heidegger, in
her own memory as the film uses flashbacks to the
past, distant and recent, to illustrate these conflicts for
the viewer, as he is also present in her engagement with
Hans Jonas who, as I have noted, had his own issues
with his own memories.
Both Arendt and Jaspers were conflicted, in very
different ways, by the same appeal that drew them
to Heidegger.36 Hence unlike the friendship between
Arendt and Jaspers (and I believe and I have elsewhere
argued that the friendship survived between them
solely or at least largely because of her efforts, as so
many relationships between men and women survive
not because of what the men do, but because of what
the women are able to shoulder alone, and following
the star of love, of loyalty, and affection) Heidegger's
and Jaspers' friendship did not survive and if Jaspers
placed the blame for this failure on Heidegger, he did
not ascribe it to Heidegger's anti-Semitism (whether
indeed of the world-historical or the more personal
kind) but and much rather to Heidegger's self-focused
character. Heidegger's failure was as a human being.
To say this does not entail that Jaspers' friendship
with Heidegger was not genuine. But even a genuine
friendship can be routed in the fashion that a changing
world in addition to the fortunes of intellectual life,
along with the stakes of academic contest, are liable to
rout a friendship in any era. Both Heidegger and Jaspers
were philosophers with a claim (especially on Jaspers'
part) to what Jasper's named "world philosophy" and
(especially on Heidegger's part) not less to a philosophy
recasting the terms of the same (toward the political for
Jaspers, toward the inception of another beginning for
Heidegger): the consequences of this conflict would
rout any friendship, with or without war. To the extent
that their friendship could survive at all it would have
to do (not unlike Arendt's own patient initiative) with
Jaspers' own extraordinary intellectual openness, his
scientific, that is to say: his philosophical probity.
36

Karl Jaspers, "Martin Heidegger," Note 239
(1961/1964), in Karl Jaspers, Basic Philosophical
Writings, ed. Leonard H. Ehrlich, Columbus: Ohio
University Press 1986, p. 510.
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Where Jaspers' friendship with Heidegger frayed
in the face of Heidegger's all-too-trivially human
limitations, there was also Jaspers' own eventual
disappointment of his own hopes for his philosophy.
Elsewhere, I have argued that it was Arendt's gift for
friendship (as Jonas also endorsed her "genius" for the
same [M 182]) that made the difference in the case of her
friendship with Heidegger as it also made the difference
in the case of her friendship with Jaspers. And here it can
be worth emphasizing that when Hannah Arendt says
that she does not "love" peoples (or nations) but only
friends: as she wrote to Scholem (this is not mentioned, it
is too complicated, I suppose, in the context of the film),
ich liebe immer nur meine Freunde.
But here and again, the meaning of one's love
for one's friends precisely for a thinker like Arendt,
this reader of Augustine who was, arguably above
all, a student of Aristotle (as a student of Heidegger
would have had to be) but also an attentive reader of
Nietzsche—this gift for friendship and that is always,
once again Aristotle, turns out to be all about loyalty,
all that is to say and this must be understood in a lived
context, about time. Aristotle remarks that friendships
that come to an end are not good friendships, as Aristotle
emphasizes in his Nicomachean Ethics (VIII, 3). Or to be
more exact, Aristotle observes that a friendship that
lasts a lifetime corresponds to or is the excellence of the
friendship of the good, and for Arendt that friendship
in fact included both Heidegger and Jaspers.
But Aristotle and his perfected habits or practical
acquisition to virtue does not help us today. For us, after
the Shoah, after the Holocaust, after the monstrous is a
deed done we need, perhaps even more than Arendt
herself, her first husband, Günther Stern, the son, as
Hans Jonas reminds us, of the psychologist William
Stern (whose legacy to us is the IQ test to this day)
and who would become Günther Anders. More even
than we need Heidegger, we need Anders' reflections
on having precisely as opposed to being: that is as the
"having done" what has now and forever been done,
more for its tenuousness and its patient attention to this
sheer thatness of things done, more even than we need
Adorno, who was such a loyal and so perfect friend to
Ander's cousin, Walter Benjamin.
The problem remains the scandal of Arendt's claim
that rather than being the very incarnation of evil as
such, Eichmann, a functionary (still worse, a German
functionary—Beamter), was simply one who pursued
with all-too typical punctilious blindness, a functionary
who as such plainly failed to think, as Arendt said (and
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as Heidegger likewise contended that modern science,
for another notorious example, does not think).37
Eichmann did not think. And so we are left fumbling
with the same frustration that worked on so many of
the film's audiences in New York.
Not thinking? What on earth could than mean
with respect to Eichmann?
To explain the claim commentators in the New York
Times and in magazines like The New Yorker (which gets
as much billing in the film as Mary McCarthy or Hans
Jonas or any other player), would either denounce
the formula and so have done with it, or else simply
refer to Heidegger in order to have done with it. As
if referring to Heidegger and to the garish professorstudent encounter as von Trotta depicted this in her
film (this flashback was mentioned at the outset), does
not complicate matters: wanting to learn to think, as
the youthful Arendt conveys this wish in the office of
the dissonantly young Professor Heidegger, she only
hears in reply what is and can only be an enormously
seductive provocation: Denken ist ein einsames Geschäft
(thinking is a lonely business).
The assertion echoes Nietzsche's reflections on
the republic of thinkers in his essay "Schopenhauer as
Educator."38 Here, the paradoxical implication is that
thinking cannot be taught, not one to another and it
cannot be practiced: one with another. With Nietzsche
echoing in Heidegger's words here, we are returned
to Aristotelian friendship—now in a suspiciously late
eighteenth century (Schopenhauer) and late nineteenth
century (Nietzsche) articulation. Thinking thus
reflects less Aristotle's converse of the soul with itself
than it becomes an event, an advent, echoing across
mountaintops, as it were: this is Schopenhauer's spiritconverse as it strikes Nietzsche. (Nor was I surprised to
find the same textual, contextual allusion echoing in the
first volume of the recently published Schwarze Hefte,
dating from 1931-1938).39 Here we are returned from
37

Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, trans. J.
Glenn Gray, New York: Harper 1968, p. 8. [Translation
modified]
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I discuss this Nietzschean reflection on thinking as the
construction and descrying of the classical memory
palace at greater length in Babich, "Who do you
think you are? On Nietzsche's Schopenhauer, Illich's
Hugh of St. Victor, and Kleist's Kant," Journal for the
Philosophical Study of Education 2 (March 2014), 1-23.

39

Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. IV Abteilung:
Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen, Bd. 94. Überlegungen II-

Arendt on love to Heidegger, all by way of Nietzsche
on the friend to Aristotle once again. Only one who is
related to one in spirit can be a friend because a friend
shares the same spirit in another bodily frame.
Aristotle defines thinking as it characterizes the
human being qua political, qua thinking animal. Thus
what fails Eichmann is nothing less than his own human
nature. It is the human condition, as Arendt would say,
that fails Eichmann in his managing, his administrating,
his obsessive, mindless pursuit of his task. It is in this
consummate or essential sense that he does not think.
Not as Aristotle defines practical thinking as this is
always about more than a practical project or end, but
ultimately, consummately, qua thinking about thinking.
I end here with a parallel to recollect my initial
question regarding the possibility of any resistance
that can count as such, needed because our own era
is no less in need of such a reflection than any other.
Thus I have elsewhere noted that Arendt concludes
her introduction to Jaspers' The Future of Germany
by reflecting on the problem of political vindication,
noting that and in fact, many of Jaspers' warnings and
predictions were realized following his predictions of
what became Germany's darkest years. In question
then is less speaking truth to power than the impotence
of so doing.
Politically I could be speaking about United States
aggression as we have seen this played out in war after
war, ongoing to this day, and even on our own soil,
and even against our own people. If the issue of public
surveillance is relevant, there is also the extraordinary
violence used to shut down every Occupy Wall Street
in every town, beginning with New York's Wall Street.
And then there is the July and August bombing of
Gaza (and Arendt's 16 September 1958 letter on the
practice of massacre as a technique to encourage the
"mass exodus of Arabs" [C 358] as a practice of standing
dating back even then to a full decade to the 9 April
1948 massacre at Deir Yassin is unsettlingly familiar)
and as there is no end to such things, most recently
we have seen the conflicts between militarized police
presence and civilians in Ferguson, Missouri. Above all
we note that such images and reports of violence are
quickly transmitted to consciousness on television and
via Twitter as they were also unreported, desultory,
inasmuch as and like television the internet turns out
to be the medium not of news, but as consummately as
VI, Schwarze Hefte, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann
2014, §1, p. 6.
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Guy Debord had argued (along with Jean Baudrillard
and also Friedrich Kittler of a very well- or thoroughlymediated non-consciousness as Edward S. Hermann
analyses what he and Chomsky call the 'propaganda
model' that silences both network news and alternative
analyses),40 and yet we rely more and more on such a
source of memory (already Edward Bernays warns
against this danger in his The Crystallization of Public
Opinion).41 Such a conception of the working transforms
of media and memory explains what has since vanished
from public memory of Occupy movements in New
York but also in Berkeley, Oakland, Boston, etc., if we
may hope that this consciousness lasts longer for towns
like Ferguson—as for Gaza, and indeed for the Ukraine.
For there is what we do in the works that we do, in
what Arendt said had to be taken into count. This is the
lasting influence of action for Arendt.
More than surveillance and suppression, more
than the images of war as Jean Baudrillard and Paul
Virilio focus on these, there are other images we also
refuse to see. If Arendt herself did not indeed refer to
animals and what we do to them, where, instructively,
perhaps, Adorno did, any context that has to do with
non-representable imagery and with comparisons
we cannot countenance, requires us to talk about
Jews and animals.42 To see the relevance here, Adorno
emphasized our rejection of the gaze. For Adorno, the
social schematization of perception in anti-Semites is such
that they do not see the Jews as human beings at all. The
constantly encountered assertion that savages, blacks,
Japanese are like animals, monkeys for example, is the key
to the pogrom. The possibility of pogroms is decided
in the moment when the gaze of a fatally-wounded
animal falls on a human being. The defiance with which
he repels this gaze—'after all, it's only an animal'—
reappears irresistibly in cruelties done to human beings,
the perpetrators having again and again to reassure
40

I have cited Debord above, and these other names
point to themes and notions that exceed this paper.
For a useful summary, see Edward S. Herman,"The
Propaganda Model: A Retrospective," Propaganda,
Politics Power 1 (December 2003), 1-14. For a beginning
of a discussion, see the first chapters of Babette Babich,
The Hallelujah Effect, Surrey: Ashgate, 2013.
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Edward Bernays, The Crystallization of Public Opinion,
New York: Liverwright, 1923.

42

I discuss some of these themes in "Adorno on Science
and Nihilism, Animals, and Jews," Symposium: Canadian
Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de
philosophie continentale 14/1 (2011), 110-45.
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themselves that it is 'only an animal,' because they
could never fully believe this even of animals.43

Failing as Adorno's comparison does to recognize the
singularity of the Shoah and as it is simply beyond
imaging (we "repel the gaze," we turn away when it
comes to factory farming and mechanized slaughter:
and new legislation, i.e, so-called ag-gag laws restricting
film and photography, promises to make turning away
even easier), the parallel is refused on both sides.44 The
animals we eat on a scale that empties everything that
has ever been said about, for or against, Heidegger's
"manufacture of corpses" phrase in his Bremen lectures,45
is because the animal husbandry industry exemplifies
Heideggerian standing reserve like nothing else. This
manufactured standing reserve corresponds to the
farming industry, the fishing industry, the leather and
fur industry, the glue industry, even the university level
industry of animal research and vivisection (which is
what the future of biotech, cloning, nanotech and stem
cell research are all about), even the dairy industry, think
of the brutally orphaned and sometimes thoughtlessly
murdered calves, and thus of "the things themselves,"
about nothing more literally literal, once again, than
Heidegger's "manufacture of corpses."46 These points,
43

Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections From
Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, London: Verso,
1974 (1951). §68, p. 105. [Henceforth cited as MM]

44

I engage our reticence even to countenance any such
parallel in Babette Babich, "'The Answer is False':
Archaeologies of Genocide," in Adorno and the Concept
of Genocide, eds. Ryan Crawford and Erik M. Vogt,
Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014.
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For references and further discussion, see Babette
Babich, "Constellating Technology: Heidegger's Die
Gefahr/The Danger" in The Multidimensionality of
Hermeneutic Phenomenology, eds. Babette Babich and
Dimitŭr Ginev, Frankfurt am Main: Springer 2014, pp.
153-82.
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It is important to note, as I now conclude, that this is
the unpleasant part, the part we are not interested in
hearing about. For it cuts too close to home, animals
constitute the very patentnly "standing reserve" that is
the supermarket array, this is about dinner, and about
what we eat. Thus we remain, and now we will want to
rise in protest at this invidious comparison, each one of
us complicit in the billions of animals "used" in science
and more stupidly still used in pharmaceutical trials,
because nothing stops drugs with horrifying sideeffects from being released to the public: the last and
best stage of such trials being the patients themselves.
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incarnadine as they are, cannot pale but pale they do. We
regard nature as standing reserve for energy and other
resources just as we regard animals as ours to dispose
of for whatever purpose from mass consumption to
research exploitation to entertainment/distraction. As
Adorno concludes his damaged aphoristic reflection:
"What was not seen as human and yet is human, is
made a thing, so that its stirrings can no longer refute
the manic gaze" (MM 105).
The point here concerns animals as it is about our
destruction of the world as if we believed it to be in
our rightful dominion to exploit (or to save). The point
has to do with Heidegger's questioning challenge to
us: do we yet have to do with thinking? If Jaspers was
right to look at The Future of Humanity in the broadest
possible way, and if Arendt follows him as the scope
of her work suggests she did, it may turn out that we
will need more than the lonely business of thought as
Heidegger spoke of the thinker in the singular, to think
about thinking. As the ancients knew and as Arendt
learned from Jaspers, thinking can only be done in a
community of other human beings who together form
a community, a world.
Here, to conclude, I return to Margarethe von
Trotta's extraordinary film, as it can indeed seem as if
the entire work of the film was needed to frame the
final scene and Barbara Sukowa's final voice over, as
Hannah Arendt, author of the Banality of Evil, muses
upon evil as she sent her most soul-rending letter to
Gershom Scholem, pronouncing upon as Arendt,
student of Jaspers and Augustine would have to do, the
essential superficiality of evil:
Evil is always only extreme but never radical, it has no
depth, and also no demonicism. It can lay the whole
world to waste, precisely because it constantly spreads
like a fungus on the surface. Deep however and radical
is ever only good.47
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My translation (B 444) of: Das Böse immer nur extrem
ist, aber niemals radikal, es hat keine Tiefe, auch keine
Dämonie. Es kann die ganze Welt verwüsten, gerade weil
es wie ein Pilz an der Oberfläche weiterwuchert. Tief aber
und radikal ist immer nur das Gute. Arendt's following
sentence continues with a comparison Kant on radical
evil, and Arendt's exchange with Jaspers regarding
this letter turns on this later comparison which should
always be set in the context of the same Goethe that
remained a constant point of reference for both Arendt
and Jaspers.

Coda
Goethe's legacy to poetic theodicy is that he sets his
argument into the mouth of Mephisto, "I am part of that
power which eternally wills evil and eternally creates
good" (or, as there is no way to better Goethe's own
words: Ich bin ein Teil von jener Kraft, die stets das Böse will
und stets das Gute schafft. And, as he goes on: Etwas, das
in böser Absicht geschieht, kann in etwas Gutes umschlagen.)
The problem, as Jaspers explains, turns upon esoteric
and that is to say subtle or complicated philosophy—
and here we are speaking of the same isolated peaks we
noted in Nietzsche's reference to Schopenhauer. Thus
as Jaspers writes to Arendt, "You have reached a point
where many people no longer understand you" (C 525),
adding a cautionary insight into the circumstances of
Arendt’s encounter with the world spirit:
Now you have delivered the crucial word against
"radical evil," against gnosis! You are with Kant, who
said: Man cannot be a devil, and I am with you. But
it's a pity that the term "radical evil," in a very different
sense that was not understood even by Goethe and
Schiller, comes from Kant. [C 525]48

Emphasizing all the accomplishments of Arendt's
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Jaspers also underlines her
naiveté: "the act of putting a book like this into the
world is an act of aggression against 'life-sustaining
lies'" (C 531). However righteous, however on the side
of right, such a challenge cannot but provoke and the
resulting response to this provocation is dismayingly
predictable: wherever "those lies are exposed and the
names of the people who live those lies are named, the
meaning of those people's existence itself is at stake.
They react by becoming deadly enemies" (C 531).
Today, we are about to witness a renewed spate of
spite against Heidegger following the recent publication
of the Black Notebooks. There is far less in these notebooks
than the incensed critics make out (and there is yet
another parallel with Arendt)49 not that that will hinder
the series of angry conferences or stem the flood of
48

For a discussion of radical evil in Kant see Allen
Wood, "The Evil in Human Nature," pp. 31-57, and
Ingolf Dalberg, "Radical Evil and Human Freedom,"
pp. 58-78, both in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide, ed. Gordon Michalson,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
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See for the reference not to Heidegger but Arendt, Seyla
Benhabib, "Who's On Trial, Eichmann or Arendt?" New
York Times Opinionator (September 21, 2014).
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published book denunciations promised for the future.
Writing to Arendt, as Jaspers does, that there is no
future for what he called "esoteric philosophy," the only
philosophy that can remain will be that practiced on the
vulgar level by the academics themselves. Some of this
vulgarity, this pettiness, this resentment of supposed
arrogance, indignation rather than hermeneutic
generosity, is on display in the film and to this extent it
matters that von Trotta’s film for all its popular appeal,
and it remains a popular accomplishment, is also a
film about the academy itself, and this is rare. Hence
it features university teaching (even qua Sixties style),
academic debates, the challenges of writing and not
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less of dealing with response (or, more commonly, nonresponse), and trials of esoteric subtlety and exoteric
force. Illuminating the dangers of political and public
backlash to the complexities inherent in philosophic
thinking, Von Trotta's Hannah Arendt most beautiful
achievement is perhaps what it shows of the profundity,
as Jaspers would say, that is the beauty of "the deep and
radical good" that it is to speak truth despite those who
fear themselves mortally injured thereby.
What will become of Arendt in the future, is what
of course becomes of any thinker, which in turn, as
Arendt memorializes Jaspers, "depends on the course
the world takes" (C 685-6).

Volume 9, No. 2, Fall 2014

